

VIII Various Approaches To a National Strategy for
the Defeat of Soviet Power (Stennis group)

A. Geographic components - (USSR, satellite orbit, communist fringe, and the free world -) Breakdown of Soviet power & influence, each area with its own vulnerabilities.

B. Spectrum of means - from military to denials of opportunity to the Soviet regime.

C. Preconditions for success

D. Situations in order of urgency

E. Capabilities

IX. Planning of Covert Operations Designed to Reduce and Retract Soviet Influence and Power (Stelle)

A. Retraction of Soviet power and influence

can be broken down into two general headings:

1. weakening Soviet power & influence by strengthening the West.
2. weakening Soviet power & influence in the communist orbit.

B. Covert operations should be planned on basis of three general considerations;

1. importance of the effects which successful or unsuccessful operations may be calculated to have on communist influence & power.
2. the degree to which our capabilities for such operations promise success.
3. the degree to which the undulating or successful conclusion of such

operations may be calculated to provoke USSR military reaction.

C. Assumes capabilities to strengthen West greater than against Soviet orbit, and, accordingly, advocates operations in West be undertaken immediately, and only selective operations against Soviet orbit.

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

" " " re subm. of Sov Reg.

UN

✓ Disarmament

fear v. hope - desires & aspirations

✓ reduction of std. of army of satellites to level of USSR

✓ exchange of ideas.

note of war

risk of closer cementing of Sov. bloc

Posters action to complicate & disrupt Sov Bloc

1. weaken Sov. control over E. Germany & Austria
2. squeeze Albania out of Sov. bloc
3. harass satellites:
a. embargo Sov. lines of commo
4. detach satellites
5. intensify restrict. on E-W trade
6. " econ + milit. pressure on Com. China

Situation of Sat

1. progressive detachment, supported
from without by armed assistance
or by threat of force -



Wisan 2/15/52

1. Director: How ^{should} the preparation of
a National Psych. Strategy be approached?

a. substantive thoughts and recommendations.
(ex. State's "Phasing of Count Operations Designed to Reduce + Retact Soviet Influence + Power")

b. affirmative approach.

c. two separate memoranda

* →

FIRST MEMO:
(1) Approach to a Natl. Psych. Strat.

from the point of view of our greatest capabilities,
both present & prospective, as appraised by US.

(a) areas

(b) methods or techniques of which
we believe we are presently capable or in a way of
becoming capable within the near-term future
(assuming high specificity to our effort)

(c) discussion of non-comit
measures required to provide framework for our
operations or to consolidate & guarantee the
gains which our efforts might be successful in
producing.

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(e) desire: clear picture of
what might be accomplished through a concentration of

effort in those fields where we have least possibilities.

(2.) Second Memo: Study of means which would prove most effective — regardless of present capabilities — in achieving ultimate US policy objectives as stated in NSC 24.

Nitze Comments on Bruck's Prop paper 7/12/28/51

1. To formulate natl. psych. strategy it is
neces. to divide task into one or more separate
problems of manageable proportions -

2. "Retraction of Sov. power & influence" is one
of such problems -

3. Natl. Objectives other than and higher
than "retraction of Sov. pow" include:

a. maintenance of free institutions in US -

b. " " " " peace -

c. " " " " strength of free
world & US leadership in it -

4. Objectives of "retraction of Sov. power"
should be sought only by means which do not
militate against objectives in #3.

Director's Group 12/28/51

1. "What can usefully be said about ways and means of bringing about a reduction of Soviet power and influence?"

2. The objectives of securing reduction of Soviet power and influence should be sought only by means which:

a. are consistent with our traditions and our evolving way of life -

b. do not incur unacceptable risks of general war -

c. do not inadvertently reduce the sum total of the strengths of our alliances or of those allied with us -

d. do not generate psychological climates unmanageably hostile to the United States.

3. Possible Approaches

a. Geographic: Soviet power & influence could be broken down into geographic components, each with its own psych. vulnerabilities — USSR, Satellite orbit, Communist fringe, and Free World —

b. Spectrum of Means: Military-paramilitary action, political revolution, & coup d'état to modification of Soviet System, enforceable agreement with the System, or more denials of opportunity to the System. Each mean would employ a variety of techniques.

c. Preconditions of Success: time phasing - (sequence of events)

d. Situations in order of decreasing urgency

e. Capabilities - (present + future)

4. Factors to be kept in proper proportion

a. practicability

b. effectiveness

c. urgency

5. Converging Approaches stressors factors in 4.

a. Full study of means wherein we presently have the greatest capabilities -

b. Full study of means that would be most effective, regardless of present capabilities, (comp'd'etat + political revolution)

c. Full study of areas of most immediate danger (Iran + S.S. Area) -

Wissner 1/2/52

Strategic plan should provide:

1. determination of priorities among areas -
2. " " " " types of operations -
3. " " " " in application of nat'l. resources -
4. general estimate of yearly budget for major segments of the effort -

Stevens (Wissner in ops.) : 1-4 should be conducted separately from formulation of basic strategy, but should follow immediately upon the heels thereof -

Bohlen : 1. still in phase of containment with relatively little that can be accomplished behind Iron Curtain in reducing Soviet power & influence.

2. Timing not yet ripe for revolution, but preparation therefor should be made -

3. Review will probably point up that priorities lie in strengthening & saving the most heavily threatened areas of the free world, i.e., SE Asia, Iran & Middle East.

Nitze : 1. Reinforcing of Iron Curtain from one side might slow down Sov. technological developments.

2. USSR vulnerabilities to economic strangulation are not great.

3. Serious econ. stresses & vulnerabilities exist with respect to all satellites, which are suffering from cutting off of E-W trade -

* 4. Freeze-up of trade from west, coupled with Soviet vacuum cleaner on other side, have produced stresses & strains, the further intensification of which might in some cases result in total collapse of satellite economy.

State paper: "Phasing of Covert Operations Designed to Reduce & Retract Soviet Influence & Power"
(Stille)

1. Covert ops. should be planned on basis of three general considerations:

a. Importance of effects which successful or unsuccessful operations may be calculated to have on Communist influence & power.

b. degree to which our capabilities for such operations promise success.

c. degree to which the undertaking a successful conclusion of such operations may be calculated to provoke USSR military reaction.

2. Covert ops. in West

a. capabilities to strengthen West greater, or can be more quickly developed, than for ops. against Sov. orbit.

b. ops. in West sh. be aimed. undertaken & sh. be selected on basis of effects they are likely to achieve.

c. areas of general importance to West & which offer most imp. targets for covert ops:

(1) France

(2) Italy

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d. areas in which covert ops. are now desirable to forestall critical situations:

- | | |
|----------------|---------------|
| (1) Iran | (5) Indonesia |
| (2) Egypt | (6) Panama |
| (3) Burma | |
| (4) Indo China | |

3. Covert ops. against Communist Orbit

a. large scale covert ops. sh. be planned in accord. with degree of sensitivity with which USSR may be expected to regard:

- (1) particular area
- (2) stage of development of western military capabilities
- (3) Kremlin's estimate of its own internal security

b. areas where large scale covert ops. might be undertaken at present time without expectation of undue risk of general war:

- (1) Communist China
- (2) North Korea
- (3) Viet Minh areas of Indo China

c. areas where large scale covert ops. might be undertaken without expectation of undue risk of war after further development of western military strength:

- (1) Albania
- (2) East Germany (after removal of W. Ger.)
- (3) Bulgaria
- (4) Manchuria
- (5) Non USSR - Central Asia

d. areas in which large scale covert ops. could be undertaken without undue risk of war only after major development of Western military strength:

- | | |
|-------------|-------------|
| (1) Finland | (5) Hungary |
| (2) Poland | (6) USSR |
| (3) Czech. | |
| (4) Romania | |

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